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The Attorney-Client Privilege After Attorney Disclosure
Courts have long espoused the principle that the right to waive
the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client and not to his attorney.1 But clients beware. In a variety of circumstances, courts have
held that a lawyer may waive2 the attorney-client privilege even
without the client's knowledge. Some courts have held that a lawyer's inadvertent out-of-court disclosure of privileged communications3 destroys the privilege.4 Others have found waiver where a
lawyer intentionally discloses his privileged communications with
l. See, e.g., Esposito v. United States, 436 F.2d 603,606 (9th Cir. 1970); Republic Gear Co.
v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967); Liggett v. Glenn, 51 F. 381, 396 (8th
Cir. 1892); Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
2. The effect of a waiver may differ according to the context in which it occurs. When
courts find that an out-of-court disclosure of a privileged co=unication "waives" the privilege, they clearly mean that the content Qf the disclosure is no longer barred from production,
see, e.g., In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973), or admission
at trial, see, e.g., Holland v. State, 17 Ala. App. 503, 86 So. 118 (1920), on privilege grounds.
The previous disclosure may enable opposing attorneys to "compel"· the client to testify concerning the disclosed communication in the sense that the client may no longer assert the
privilege to avoid answering their questions. See Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D.
74, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (dictum); Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 95 Cal. Rptr. 265
(1971). The circumstances in which courts will allow the opposing party to examine the attorney are not well-settled. Generally, where the client has infringed the attorney's honor
through allegations of improper or inept behavior, the attorney may testify to refute those
allegations. See, e.g., People v. Ottenstror, 127 Cal. App. 2d 104,273 P.2d 289 (1954); Grant v.
Harrison, 116 Va. 642, 82 S.E. 718 (1914); cf. Seeger v. Odell, 64 Cal. App. 2d 397, 148 P.2d
901, 906 (1944) (both client and attorney involved in fraudulent transaction). It is unclear,
however, when an attorney may be compelled to testify regarding co=unications which were
privileged when made, but were later disclosed. One judge's co=ents in a case in which a
lawyer was compelled to testify against a former client regarding such co=unications illustrate the problem:
Least of all should the courts seize upon slight and equivocal circumstances as a technical
reason for destroying the privilege. Here the attorney was compelled to testify against his
client under threat of punishment for contempt. Such procedure would have been justified only in case the defendant with knowledge of his rights had waived the privilege in
open court or by his statements and conduct had furnished explicit and convincing evidence that he did not understand, desire or expect that his statements to his attorney
would be kept in confidence. Defendant's attorney should have chosen to go to jail and
take his chances of release by a higher court. This is not intended as a criticism of the
action of the attorney. It is, however, a suggestion to any and all attorneys who may have
the misfortune to be confronted by the same or a similar problem.
People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 447, 277 P.2d 94, 101 (1954) (Shinn, J., concurring).
An attorney has an ethical duty to maintain the confidences of his client. See ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 4 (1978). This Note does·not discuss when an attorney's disclosure constitutes a violation of this ethical duty.
3. This Note will not examine the criteria for finding a co=unication privileged. For a
case setting forth these criteria, see United States Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2292 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961 & Supp. 1979). The circuits are split over when co=unication to counsel made by
agents ofa corporation are privileged. Compare United States v. The Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d
1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980) (adopting a "control group" test) with
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en bane) (adopting a "substantial responsibility" test). This Note assumes that the communications disclosed would sat-
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the client in pursuit of the client's cause.5 Still others have found
waiver where, during the trial, a lawyer introduces or fails to object
to the introduction of such communications. 6 In all of these cases,
the courts have offered no meaningful rationale for creating exceptions to the rule that the attorney-client privilege cannot be waived
without the client's consent. At the same time, courts obeying the
"client consent rule" have failed to recognize that some circumstances may warrant exceptions. To properly determine when an attorney's disclosure waives the client's privilege, courts should
recognize and balance the interests that weigh for and against finding waiver.
This Note examines the interests that must be balanced in determining when an attorney's disclosure7 waives the attorney-client
privilege. Part I presents three judicial standards defining the class
of attorney disclosures that waive the privilege: the traditional client
consent rule that only attorney disclosures to which the client has
consented constitute waiver; 8 the broader "implied authority" view
that attorney disclo'sures made with the client's consent or with an
intent to further the client's cause constitute waiver;9 and the still
more expansive view that all attorney disclosures falling within the
scope of the attorney's agency authority to act for the client waive
the privilege. 10 Part II examines how the primary purpose of the
attorney-client privilege - to encourage full and free communication between attorney and client - is promoted by upholding the
privilege even after an attorney's disclosure without his client's consent.11 Part III turns to two other societal interests - judicial efficiency and fairness to opposing parties - that adherence to the
isfy the requirement for a valid claim of attorney-client privilege were it not for the finding of
waiver.
4. See, e.g., Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546
(D.D.C. 1970).
5. See, e.g., Sprader v. Mueller, 265 Minn. 111, 127 N.W.2d 176 (1963),
6. See, e.g., United States v. King, 484 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 904
(1974); Jones v. Marble Co., 137 N.C. 185, 49 S.E. 94 (1904).
7. This Note examines only the effect of attorney disclosures that occur during the existence of the attorney-client relationship.
8. See, e.g., Liggett v. Glenn, 51 F. 381 (8th Cir. 1892); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); Scheuer v. Scheuer, 239 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Southern R.R.
v. White, 108 Ga. 201, 33 S.E. 952 (1899); Mileski v. Locker, 14 Misc. 2d 252, 178 N.Y.S.2d 911
(Sup. Ct. 1958).
9. See, e.g., Sprader v. Mueller, 265 Minn. i 11, 127 N.W.2d 176 (1963),
10. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.), cert,
denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979).
11. See, e.g., Liggett v. Glenn, 51 F. 381 (8th Cir. 1892); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes
Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464 (E.D. Mich. 1954); Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 345 A.2d
830 (1975); In re Reuter, 6 Misc. 2d 411, 163 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct.), '!lfd., 4 A.D.2d 252, 164
N.Y.S.2d 534 (App. Div. 1957).
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client consent rule may impair, and balances these interests against
that of free communication in the context of in-court and out-ofcourt attorney disclosures. It concludes that for attorney disclosures
made out of court, neither fairness nor judicial efficiency provide
sufficient reason to deviate from the client consent rule. For attorney
disclosures made in court, however, Part III concludes that a court
could find that fairness and judicial efficiency justify holding the
privilege waived.

l.

THREE STANDARDS OF ATTORNEY

A.

W AIYER

Consent

The privilege against compelled disclosure of confidential communications between lawyer and client dates at least as far back as
the reign of Elizabeth I in the late sixteenth century. I2 Early courts
viewed the privilege as protecting the attorney's honor; the client had
no right to claim or to waive the privilege. I3 Near the beginning of
the eighteenth century, courts adopted the theory that the privilege
exists to protect the client rather than the attomey. I4 As courts
adopted this new theory, they also formulated a new rule of waiver:
the client alone could waive the privilege. Is Courts apparently believed that clients needed protection from non-compelledI 6 attorney
disclosures as well as from legally compelled attorney disclosures. 17
After the modem view of the attorney-client privilege developed,
numerous courts held that a client must consent to his attorney's disclosure before it can constitute waiver of the privilege. Is In these
courts' view, a client's consent to disclosure of privileged communications indicates that the client no longer relies on the privilege's
promise of secrecy, and therefore, that the privilege no longer promotes free communication between the client and the attomey. I9
12. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at§ 2290.
13. See, e.g., Winchester v. Fournier, 2 Ves. Sr. 445 (1753).
14. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at § 2290.
15. [The client] should be able to place unrestricted and unbounded confidence in the
professional agent, and . . . the co=unications he so makes to hinI should be kept secret, unless with his consent (for it is his privilege, and not the privilege of the confidential
agent), that he should be enabled properly to conduct his litigation.
Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia, 2 Ch. D. 644,649 (1876), quoted in J. WIGMORE, supra
note 3, § 2291 at 547.
16. ''Non-compelled" disclosures for the purposes of this Note include both voluntary and
accidental disclosures by the attorney.
17. See, e.g., Jones v. Marble Co., 137 N.C. 237, 49 S.E. 94 (1904); Craig, Lessee of Annesley v. Richard, Earl of Anglesea, 17 T. Howell, State Trials 1139, 1241 (1943) (Recorder, arguing for the privilege), quoted in 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2291 at 545-46.
18. See note 8 supra. The client's consent may sometimes be inferred from the circumstances. See Hi=elfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir. 1949).
19. This same reasoning underlies the rule that the client's disclosure of the co=unication to a third party constitutes waiver, see In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 867 (1973), and the rule that the privilege never attaches unless the client takes rea-
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Holding the privilege waived thereafter serves society's interest in
having complete evidence presented in court. Other courts, however,
have held that an attorney's voluntary disclosure waives the privilege
even without the client's consent.20 Attorneys have this expanded
power to waive the privilege under the "implied authority" and
"agency authority" standards.
B.

Implied Authority

Some courts hold that an attorney's intentional disclosure without the client's consent waives the attorney-client privilege if the attorney believed the disclosure would advance the client's cause. 21 In
Sprader v. Mueller, 22 for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that an attorney's disclosure of privileged communications
waived the privilege even though the client had not consented to the
disclosure. Mrs. Sprader had made a statement to her attorney that
conflicted with her later testimony at trial. Her attorney disclosed
the statement to a county prosecutor in order to spare her from an
interview and in exchange for information the prosecutor controlled.
In a subsequent civil suit, the opposing attorney sought to introduce
the inconsistent disclosed statement, arguing that the disclosure
waived any privilege. The trial court held the communication inadsonable precautions to prevent third parties from overhearing the communication. See
Schwartz v. Wenger, 267 Minn. 40, 124 N.W.2d 489 (1963). In all of these situations, disclosure of the co=unication to the third party makes it unnecessary to compel the client or the
attorney to disclose the content of the co=unication and holding the privilege attached to the
communication waived does not chill future attorney-client communications. But the first effect alone does not provide a satisfactory theory for waiver of the privilege. Requiring only
that the disclosure be non-compelled would mean that bad faith attorney disclosures should
waive the privilege, but see Scheller v. Scheller, 239 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); that
erroneous court rulings compelling disclosure should also waive it, but see Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978); and that stolen attorney-client communications should also constitute waiver. But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley
& Co., 466 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn. 1979).
20. See, e.g., Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546
(D.D.C. 1970); Sprader v. Mueller, 265 Minn. 111, 127 N.W.2d 176 (1963).
21. See Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971); Sprader v.
Mueller, 265 Minn. II I, 127 N.W.2d 176 (1963). Wigmore argued that implied authority
should cover "all disclosures (oral or written) voluntarily made to the opposing party or to
third persons in the course of negotiations for settlement or in the course of taking adverse
steps in the litigation . . . when necessary in the opinion of the attorney." 8 J. WJOMORE,
supra note 3, at § 2325. Any other voluntary disclosure by the attorney without the consent of
the client, Wigmore said, should not constitute waiver. Wigmore's statement that the attorney
must believe the disclosure "necessary" for there to be implied authority suggests that he
thought the exception should cover only the attorney's intentional disclosure and not those
caused by inadvertence. However, Wigmore also explicitly argued that "involuntary" disclosure (presumably Wigmore meant inadvertent rather than legally compelled) by the attorney
should also waive the privilege. Id.
For a discussion of attorney-client privilege problems surrounding exchange of information among attorneys representing clients with a co=unity of interest, see Note, Waiver of
Attorney-Client Privilege on Inter-Attorney Exchange ofIeformation, 63 YALE L.J. 1030 (1954).
22. 265 Minn. Ill, 127 N.W.2d 176 (1963).
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missible. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that
because an attorney has the implied authority to disclose privileged
information to further the client's cause, the disclosure waived the
privilege.23
In many cases where the attorney believes disclosure advances
the client's cause, clients would probably not object to disclosure if
consulted at the time. In these cases, holding the privilege waived
seems consistent with the policy underlying the consent rule: 24 a client's fortuitous ignorance should not preserve the privilege where the
client would have consented to disclosure had he been consulted.
But this reasoning ignores the frequent failure of attorneys to realize
that their disclosures may constitute waiver. The consent rule protects clients from this lack of c:are by their attorneys. The consent
rule also protects clients who would have objected to disclosure had
they been consulted by their attorneys. The implied authority standard therefore subverts the policy underlying the client consent rule.
C. Agency Authority
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has embraced
an even more expansive standard for attorney waiver of the attorney-client privilege. In In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean
Transportation, 25 the Circuit held that a client's grant of agency au23. 265 Minn. at 117, 127 N.W. 2d at 180:
In modem practice pretrial discovery has resulted in the routine exchange of information on a voluntary basis to obviate the expense of taking formal depositions. We believe
that within limits which do not offend our sense of professional propriety (however elusive
this definition of the rule may prove to be), an attorney has the right to use privileged
matter for legitimate bargaining purposes. In so doing, he may waive the privilege without committing any breach of his ethical obligation to respect his client's confidences.
24. One court justified waiver in a case with facts similar to Sprader on a theory of "implied consent." In Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971), the
plaintiff's attorney disclosed to a police officer the plaintiff's confidential statements concerning
the cause of a car accident in order to attempt to prevent the filing of criminal charges against
his client. The court held that consent could be inferred because the disclosures were made for
the plaintiff's benefit and were reasonably necessary to protect him from criminal liability.
Because it found the privilege waived by the disclosure, the court held the plaintiff could be
questioned about his statements in a subsequent personal injury action.
25. 604 F.2d 672, 675, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979).
Ocean Transportation arose out of a grand jury investigation begun by the Justice Department's Antitrust Division into ocean freight transportation. In August of 1976, defendant SeaLand Services received subpoenas duces tecum requiring the production of specified documents. In response, Sea-Land instructed its attorneys to produce all documents not covered by
the attorney-client privilege. The attorneys marked the privileged documents with a "P," but
then mistakenly delivered them along with the non-privileged documents to the Justice Department. The Justice Department noticed the marks and, thinking counsel might have erred,
asked them whether they intended to produce all the documents. Sea-Land's attorneys told
them they had and that they claimed no privilege.
In March of 1977, the attorneys realized they had delivered privileged documents the previous September. They met with Government attorneys to explain the blunder, but did not
formally request the documents' return. They did not disclose the gaffe to Sea-Land until
December of 1977. When Sea-Land learned of the accidental delivery, it fired the attorneys
and obtained new counsel. The new counsel formally requested the return of the documents,
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thority to an attorney justifies charging the client with a non-compelled attorney disclosure. In the Ocean Transportation case,
attorneys defending a target of a federal grand jury investigation accidently delivered privileged documents to the government that the
defendant had instructed counsel to withhold. The appellate court
affirmed the district court's ruling26 that the disclosure destroyed the
attorney-client privilege, stating:
To be sure in the final analysis, the privilege is for the client, not the
attorney, to assert. . . .Original counsel, however, acted as [the client's] agent in determining which documents would be produced pursuant to the subpoena and which documents would be withheld under
the attorney-client privilege. Original counsel acted within the scope
of the authority conferred upon it, and [the client] may not now be
heard to complain about how that authority was exercised. 27
but while negotiations were pending, the Government sought to question a Sea-Land employee about them before the grand jury. The employee asserted the attorney-client privilege.
604 F.2d at 674-75.
26. The district court published no opinion explaining its ruling that the disclosure waived
the privilege. After the court of appeals found that the privilege underlying the disclosed documents had been waived, the district court rejected a government argument that the disclosure
waived the privilege as to the subject maller of the disclosed documents. See In re Grand Jury
Proceedings Investigation of Ocean Transp., (1980-1] TRADE CAs. 77,938 (D.D.C. 1980). See
note 42 i,!fra for a discussion of subject matter waiver after non-compelled attorney disclosure.
21. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979).
Ocean Transportation is the first federal appellate court case holding that breach of the
attorney-client privilege by an attorney's accidental disclosure results in a waiver. The first
case to suggest a rationale to support this result was United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co.,
15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954). The case involved a company that had allowed Justice
Department officials access to its files, failing to realize they contained documents protected by
the attorney-client privilege. The government attempted to use copies of the privileged documents against Kelsey-Hayes. The court held that the disclosure destroyed the privilege,
Though this result was consistent with previous cases, the rationale was not. The court held
the privilege waived not because of the client's voluntary disclosure, but rather on the rationale
that the policy underlying the privilege could no longer be served once the communication's
confidentiality was breached:
[E]ven though the privilege may once have attached, that does not mean that the subject
matter of the communication is forever immune from being used as evidence. The cloak
of confidence may be lifted by subsequent events, with or without the concurrence of the
party claiming the privilege. . . .
[A]fter the first publication the communication is no longer confidential and there is no
reason for recognizing the privilege.
15 F.R.D. at 464.
A later case, Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546
(D.D.C. 1970), adopted the Kelsey-Hayes rationale. Pursuant to a consent order, the plaintiff
had turned over certain documents to its attorney, who, without examining the documents,
delivered them to the opposing attorneys. After realizing that some of the materials were
privileged, the attorney attempted to exclude the documents. The court, however, held the
privilege waived, finding that the breach of confidentiality destroyed "the basis for the continued existence of the privilege." 314 F. Supp. at 549.
In other cases involving inadvertent disclosures, some courts have relied upon the reasoning of Kelsey-Hayes and Underwater Storage, focusing on the breach of confidentiality rather
than the client's consent to, or participation in, the disclosure. See, e.g., Ranney-Brown Distrib., Inc. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3 (S.D. Ohio 1977). The reasoning of KelseyHayes and Underwater Storage was expressly rejected, however, in Dunn Chem. Co. v.
Sybron Corp., (1975-2] TRADE CAs. 67,458 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court held that the acciden-
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This agency theory would make virtually every attorney disclosure
during the time the client retains counsel a waiver of the privilege. 28
Even disclosures caused by theft of privileged communications from
an attorney's office might constitute waiver under this theory. 29
To justify its agency authority standard for attorney waiver of the
attorney-client privilege, the D.C. Circuit asserted that once the confidentiality of privileged communications is breached, the client no
longer reasonably values the privilege. 30 The court also claimed that
upholding the privilege after disclosure would be unfair to opposing
counsel.31 This Note challenges both of these assertions: Part II artal production of privileged documents during discovery did not waive the privilege, despite
the breach of confidentiality. The court deemed it "important to look beyond the 'objective
fact of production,' which the Underwater Storage case did not." [1975-2] TRADE CAs. at
67,463. "What is important is an intention of confidentiality - the intention of the client."
[1975-2] TRADE CAS. at 67,463.
28. It is not clear how the decision would affect the rule barring waiver where an attorney
intentionally discloses in violation of the client's known intent to withhold. For a case which
adopted that rule, see Scheller v. Scheller, 239 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); cf. Liggett
v. Glenn, 51 F. 381 (8th Cir. 1892) (disclosure by attorney not made in pursuance of client's
interest so that privilege was not waived). The Ocean Transportation court suggested that it
was because the attorney's disclosure appeared intentional that it felt the privilege should be
waived:
Perhaps this latter rule should not be strictly applied to all cases of unknown or inadvertent disclosure; this, however, is not a case where any such exception is appropriate. Here,
the disclosure cannot be viewed as having been inadvertent in all respects. Original counsel knew that some papers marked "P" had been divulged. This production was brought
to their attention on at least one occasion; each time, however, said counsel declined to
assert the privilege.
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 915 (1979).
29. The Ocean Transportation court stated that the risk of theft of documents from the
attorney's possession falls upon the client. Wigmore expresses this as a normative rule, see 8 J.
W!GMORE, supra note 3, at§ 2328, however, his conclusion was based on an assumption which
itself seems unwise. He argued that the risk that third parties might overhear the communications should always fall upon the client, and therefore that the client should also bear the risk
of theft by third persons from the attorney. For a case that apparently adopts Wigmore's rule
concerning eavesdroppers, see Lanza v. New York State Joint Legislative Comm., 164
N.Y.S.2d 9, 143 N.E.2d 772, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856 (1957) (communication with the attorney overheard through "bugging" device - the court stated the privilege was thereby waived).
For cogent commentary criticizing the Lanza decision, see Comment, J)ue Process and the
Allorney-Client Privilege, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309 (1957); Note, Allorney-C/ient Privilege Not
Violated by Playing Recording ef Consultation at Legislative Hearing, 36 TEXAS L. REV. 505
(1958). One court has expressly rejected Wigmore's normative rule concerning stolen privileged documents, finding it inconsistent with modem authority. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Minn. 1979).
30. The Government attorneys' minds cannot be expunged, the grand jury is familiar
with the documents, and various witnesses' testimony regarding the papers has been
heard. This is not a case of mere inadvertence where the breach of confidentiality can be
easily remedied. Here, the disclosure cannot be cured simply by a return of the documents. The privilege has been permanently destroyed.
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 915 (1979).
31. Most importantly, it would be unfair and unrealistic now to permit the privilege's
assertion as to these documents which have been thoroughly examined and used by the
Government for several years.
604 F.2d at 675.
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gues that clients often have good reason to value the privi~ege even
after attorney disclosure, while Part III concludes that fairness concerns, even when considered along with the judicial efficiency allegedly promoted by an expansive waiver standard, do not warrant
finding waiver because of an out-of-court attorney disclosure.
II.

THE CASE FOR THE CLIENT CONSENT STANDARD

The attorney-client privilege encourages each client to disclose
all the relevant facts surrounding his legal problems to his attorney. 32 Full disclosure enables the attorney to base his actions and
advice on an accurate understanding of the facts; in short, it enables
him to better represent his client's interest. The privilege encourages
full communication between attorney and client because it frees clients from the fear that what they tell the attorney will be later used
against them. 33 To this end, neither the attorney nor the client may
be compelled under sanction of law to disclose the content of their
privileged communications until the privilege has been waived. 34
Even when a judge unwittingly requires disclosure of privileged
communications, that disclosure does not destroy the privilege. 35
Just as protecting clients from compelled attorney disclosures encourages free communication with attorneys, protecting clients from
unauthorized, non-compelled disclosures by attorneys may have the
same effect. This conclusion follows from three observations. First,
contrary to the D.C. Circuit's claim in Ocean Transportation, clients
have good reason to value the privilege even after disclosure by the
attorney. Second, traditional remedies available to a client whose
attorney has disclosed privileged information without permission are
inadequate substitutes for preservation of the privilege after attorney
disclosure. Finally, if an expansive attorney waiver standard is
.adopted, some clients will recognize both the diminished scope of the
privilege and the greater risks accompanying unauthorized attorney
32. Wade v. Ridley, 87 Me. 368, 373, 32 A. 975, 976 (1895):
While the right of every person to conduct his own litigation should be scrupulously
respected, he should not be discouraged, but rather encouraged, in early seeking the
assistance or advice of a good lawyer upon any question of legal right. In order that the
lawyer may properly perform his important function, he should be fully informed of all
facts possibly bearing upon the question. The person consulting a lawyer should be encouraged to co=unicate all such facts, without fear that his statements may possibly be
used against him.
33. See, e.g., Liggett v. Glenn, 51 F. 381, 397 (8th Cir. 1892); United States v. KelseyHayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464 (E.D. Mich. 1954); Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 13435, 345 A.2d 830, 837-38 (1975); In re Reuter, 6 Misc. 2d 411, 413, 163 N.Y.S.2d 576, 580-81
(Sup. Ct.), qjfd, 4 A.D.2d 252, 164 N.Y.S.2d 534 (App. Div. 1957),
34. People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 277 P.2d 94 (1954).
35. See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978)
(inadvertent production of certain documents in accelerated discovery proceedings did not
waive the privilege because the production was, in effect, compelled).
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disclosures, and are therefore more likely to withhold information
from their attorneys.
The first observation, that clients value the privilege even after
unauthorized attorney disclosure, seems almost undeniable. The client wishes to prevent disclosure because he values both maintaining
confidentiality and keeping the communication out of court. Once a
disclosure occurs, the value of confidentiality is reduced. On this basis, some courts have concluded that the client no longer values the
privilege after disclosure. 36 But these courts have ignored the value
to the client of keeping the information out of court. The preservation of the privilege may be invaluable if an opposing party seeks to
introduce the disclosed communication as evidence at trial. 37 In
such a situation, the standard for waiver determines whether the
privilege can be asserted at trial to exclude the communication.
A client arguably will not value preservation of the privilege very
highly where an attorney discloses a document (or other real evidence) not in itself privileged, but obtained through a confidential
communication from the client. In such a situation, even if the privilege is preserved and the fact of communication remains inadmissible, opposing attorneys can nevertheless introduce the disclosed
document. Communications that are not privileged from production
in the hands of the client do not become privileged when transferred
to the attorney. 38 After the disclosure, protecting the fact of communication to the attorney might be of small value since the document
is subject to an order for production and is admissible at trial.
Where the attorney discloses a privileged communication itself,
however, the client may value the preservation of the privilege quite
highly. Often there will be no way for the opposing party to introduce the substance of the communication without also proving the
fact of communication. In this situation, if the privilege is preserved, the opposing parties cannot introduce that evidence. If the
court holds that the disclosure waived the privilege, the opposing
parties could introduce the communication itself to establish the content of the communication. 39
36. E.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464
(E.D. Mich. 1954).
37. See, e.g., Sprader v. Mueller, 265 Minn. ll I, 127 N.W.2d 176 (1963).
38. See, e.g., Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953).
39. Dodging the hearsay bar might be a problem in some cases, however. Where the client's attorney orally disclosed a communication, opposing parties might have a difficult time
finding a hole through which to introduce the testimony of the party to whom the attorney
disclosed, in order to establish the attorney's statements. Courts are prone to finding exceptions to the hearsay rule where "convenient," however. See, e.g., Holland v. State, 17 Ala.
App. 503, 86 So. I 18 (1920) (where the client disclosed privileged communications, hearsay
held no bar to testimony concerning the client's statements). Where the attorney discloses a
privileged written communication from the client, the hearsay bar would not exist. The opposing party would need to authenticate the communication - establishing that the client was the
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The difference between these two situations is best illustrated
through examples. Assume that a client charged with robbing a
bank delivers a privileged communication - a letter - to his defense attorney, and that in the letter the client admits that he committed the robbery and explains that he has buried the money
nearby. Suppose that after reading the note, the lawyer accidently
drops it on the street while returning to his office. A passerby picks it
up, reads it, and delivers it to the prosecutor. Unless the privilege is
waived by this inadvertent disclosure, the prosecutor cannot introduce the letter at trial. Although the disclosed information would
provide leads to other incriminating evidence, the client would value
having the privilege preserved.
Assume that the same defendant had written the same note to his
mother and later recovered it from her and delivered it to the attorney. Again, assume that the note accidentally reaches the hands of
_the prosecutor. The note itself is not privileged since it was not written in reliance on the privilege's promise of secrecy.40 Even if the
privilege continued after the disclosure, so that the opposing attorney
could not introduce communications between client and attorney
into evidence, the privilege would not bar introduction of the note. 41
Preservation of the privilege in this situation would therefore benefit
the client less than if the communication itself were privileged.
Yet even where the attorney discloses a document not in itself
privileged, preservation of the privilege may promote the client's interest. For example, waiver of the privilege would enable opposing
counsel to prove that a client delivered a possibly incriminating document to his attorney. From that fact of delivery, a jury might infer
that the client knew the document was incriminating and was therefore attempting to conceal it. Similarly, a jury might draw inferences
unfavorable to the client merely because the damaging document
was held in secrecy.
Clients might also value the privilege even after disclosure of a
non-privileged document because courts often do not limit waiver to
the information actually disclosed, and digested by the third party.42
By compelling production of privileged documents that were disclosed to a third party but are no longer within that party's knowledge or possession, a court often provides a source of evidence not
otherwise available to the opposing party. Often courts rationalize
declarant - and introduce it as an admission by a party opponent. For a codified definition of
an admission by party opponent, see FED. R. Evm. 80I(d)(2).
40. See, e.g., Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79 (1913); Palantini v. Sarian, 15 N.J.
Sup. 34, 83 A.2d 24 (1951).
41. The note would not be barred from introduction under the rules of evidence. See note
39 supra.
42. See, eg., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1976);
Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970).
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this result on the ground that any waiver should waive the privilege
with respect to the entire subject of the disclosure.43 All these possibilities indicate that, whether or not the disclosed document was
privileged, a client may reasonably value the secrecy of his communications concerning the document even after the document is disclosed.
Showing that the client has good reason to value the privilege
even after attorney disclosure is not alone sufficient to justify the client consent rule for attorney waiver. If clients had adequate remedies for noncompelled attorney disclosures, waiver of the privilege
after disclosure would not necessarily chill free communication between client and attorney. But the remedies available to a client
whose attorney has disclosed privileged communications are far
from adequate. A client confronted by an unauthorized attorney
disclosure could either bring a private suit for damages against the
attorney44 or encourage a bar association to investigate the attorney's.
43. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1976);
Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970) (in
both cases it was enough to warrant subject matter waiver that the disclosure was "voluntary").
The rule that the waiver extends beyond the content of the disclosure contents to its subject
matter developed because of the unfairness in allowing clients to selectively introduce privileged information. If the waiver extended only to the disclosure's contents, the client could
disclose favorable information and withhold unfavorable information on the same subject.
This would be unfair since "the privilege of secret consultation is intended only as an incidental means of defense and not as an independent means of attack, and to use it in the latter
character is to abandon it in the former." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2327, at 638.
The rule has commonly been applied when the client offers his or his attorney's testimony
at trial. See Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 521 (1957). The rule has not been limited, however, to
disclosures at trial. See, e.g., Wild v. Payson, 7 F.R.D. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). Anytime a disclosure is intentional, there is a strong probability that the client is being selective as to the information he discloses. The probability would seem extremely high where the client knows that
the disclosures might be exposed in court and his liability thereby affected. Nevertheless,
where it is clear that the client has not sought to distort facts by disclosing only favorable
.information, the rule against partial waiver should not apply.
Some courts have recognized that finding the disclosure ''voluntary" is not sufficient to
justify a subject matter waiver. In Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, 412 F. Supp. 286 (N.D.
Ill. 1976), a client at a pretrial deposition had voluntarily disclosed part of a privileged conversation. The court found that the disclosure was not intended to reveal only favorable information, since it was of limited scope in response to the specific questions posed by the opposing
attorneys. Thus, the court held the waiver applied oQ.ly to the specific contents of the disclosure. It considered that such a ruling would "promote the fairness which the partial disclosure
qualification is designed to encourage while serving the compelling public policy considerations underlying the attorney-client privilege." 412 F. Supp. at 289. See also In re Grand Jury
Proceedings Investigation of Ocean Transp., [1980-1] Trade Cas. 77,938 (D.D.C. 1980).
Several courts have held that a voluntary disclosure of privileged documents to a governmental agency during a non-public agency investigation does not waive the privilege for purposes of a separate proceeding initiated by private plaintiffs. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc.
v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). Contra, In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litigation, 61 F.R.D. 453
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
44. See, e.g., Lakoff v. Lionel Corp., 207 Misc. 319, 137 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Sup. Ct. 1955);
Taylor v. Blacklow, 3 Bing. N.C. 235 (1836).
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breach of his ethical duty not to disclose privileged information. 45
Private damage suits inadequately remedy the injury caused by
attorney disclosure for a number of reasons. First, it is doubtful that
all attorney disclosures that injure a client constitute breaches of the
attorney's duty to exercise reasonable care in managing the client's
affairs. 46 Second, the amount of damages caused by the disclosure
may be difficult to prove.47 Finally, money damages arguably offer
inadequate compensation in criminal cases where the attorney's disclosure has cost the client his freedom. Similarly, sanctions imposed
by courts to discipline attorneys do not replace the losses of the client. The inadequacy of both of these remedies is suggested by their
failure to deter many non-compelled attorney disclosures. 48
Clients reasonably value the attorney-client privilege after attorney disclosure; available remedies for attorney disclosure do little to
replace that value if lost. All that remains in justifying the client
consent rule is to show that some clients will recognize these two
truths, and will therefore communicate less freely with their attorneys if a more expansive attorney waiver rule is adopted. This step
in the argument must be taken more gingerly, for although it seems
clear that protecting clients from legally compelled disclosures encourages clients to communicate freely with their attorneys, it is not
clear that protecting clients from attorneys' non-compelled disclosures produces the same effect. First, attorneys usually try to avoid
disclosing damaging information except where some offsetting benefit will result from the disclosure. Thus, fewer clients will hear of
non-compelled disclosures of privileged information, and fewer will
rely on the preservation of the privilege after disclosure in deciding
45. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 4 (1974). See, e.g., United
States v. Costen, 38 F. 24 (D. Colo. 1889).
46. Clients rarely sue their attorneys for unauthorized disclosure of privileged communications. This evidences the substantial deterrents to the bringing of such suits. The rare cases
where the client has sued involved intentional attorney disclosures made with the purpose of
betraying the client's interest. See, e.g., Lakoffv. Lionel Corp., 207 Misc. 319, 137 N.Y.S.2d
806 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Taylor v. Blacklow, 3 Bing. N.C. 235 (1836). Although most deliberate,
non-compelled attorney disclosures will necessarily constitute breaches of the attorney's duty
to exercise reasonable care in managing his client's affairs, in a case like Sprader v. Mueller,
265 Minn. 111, 127 N.W.2d 176, (1963), where an attorney discloses with the client's interest in
mind, a court might find that the action was not negligent as a matter of law.
47. In order to recover damages against the attorney for the loss of or failure to win a case
because of the attorney's negligence, the client generally bears the difficult burden of demonstrating that, but for the negligence complained of, the client would have been successful in the
prosecution or defense of the action. See, e.g., Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal. App. 2d 751, 8
Cal. Rptr. 32 (1960).
48. E.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979): Ranney-Brown Distrib., Inc. v. E. T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 75
F.R.D. 3 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Dunn Chem. Co. v. Sybron Corp., 1975-2 TRADE CAs. 67,458
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546
(D.D.C. 1970); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, No. 61-C-147(2) (E.D. Mo. Mar.
20, 1963); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United
States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
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how much to tell their attorneys. Second, even among those clients
who know of the protections against an attorney's non-compelled
disclosures, some probably are not induced to disclose anything to a
lawyer that they would not disclose without the protections. A client
who does not trust his lawyer's loyalty or care in handling privileged
information will likely distrust his lawyer generally, and might take
his legal business elsewhere.
Nevertheless, some clients will not fully trust the lawyers they
retain, and will also know whether an attorney's disclosure waives
their privilege. A rule preventing waiver when attorneys make unauthorized disclosures will encourage these clients to communicate
sensitive information they would otherwise withhold. While the
number of clients so induced to share more information may be
small, the total amount of evidence withheld from the trier of fact
when the rule is followed is also small.49 But promoting communication does entail other costs; in addition to reducing the amount of
evidence available to the trier of fact, 50 the client consent rule may
impose hardships on both opposing parties and the judicial system.
The next part of this Note examines those hardships, and concludes
that they vary substantially depending on whether or not the disclosure occurs during a court proceeding.

III.

THE COSTS OF THE CLIENT CONSENT STANDARD

The dilemma of when an attorney disclosure should waive the
attorney-client privilege involves a choice between costly alternatives. Courts faced with unauthorized attorney disclosures can either
hold the attorney-client privilege waived, thereby sacrificing the free
communication promoted by the client consent standard, or they can
uphold the privilege and take measures to protect it after disclosure.
The costs of protective measures may include reduced judicial efficiency and unfairness to opposing parties. The magnitude of these
49. The evidence that would qualify for admission but for the client consent rule includes
communications that come into the hands of the opposing attorneys because of the attorney's
non-compelled disclosures not made in bad faith to the client's cause, and the inferences that
one could rationally draw from such communications. The consent rule does not prevent the
introduction of evidence obtained from the disclosure where introduction does not require
proof of ~e communication itself.
A direct relationship exists between the number of attorney disclosures of privileged information and the degree to which the client consent rule encourages attorney-client communications; the more often such disclosures occur, the more likely that clients will know of them and
the greater the likelihood that they will rely on the rule's protection in disclosing information
to their attorney.
SO. Part Ill of the Note balances society's interest in fairness and judicial efficiency against
the net benefit society otherwise realizes from the client consent standard. The Note assumes
that the cost of lost evidence remains important in determining the proper waiver rule; however, Part III does not discuss that cost explicitly simply because the very existence of the
underlying privilege indicates that the society has elected to sacrifice evidence in order to encourage attorney-client communication.
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costs will vary with the protective measures taken, and these in turn
vary considerably depending upon whether the unauthorized disclosure occurs in or out of court. In choosing between waiver and protective measures, courts should balance the cost of abandoning the
client consent standard against the costs of feasible protective measures.
A.

Costs of Protecting the Privilege After Out-of-Court .Disclosure

Although a court can order a variety of measures to protect the
attorney-client privilege after an out-of-court51 disclosure, 52 the least
costly alternative will usually be to hold that the specific information
disclosed is inadmissible as evidence. While a broader exclusionary
rule might more adequately remedy the injury inflicted by the disclosure, fully counteracting the effects of disclosure is not feasible.
Once opposing attorneys acquire information from a disclosure, it is
difficult to prevent them from following the trail toward other evidence that the information suggests.53 Furthermore, courts would
, usually have great_ difficulty even tracing an attorney's steps from
disclosed information to other evidence. Courts would also have
trouble determining whether the opposing attorneys would not have
discovered the evidence but for the disclosure. Because of these difficulties, it would be impractical for the court to exclude any evidence
other than the specific information disclosed. Yet even this narrow
exclusionary rule arguably causes some unfairness to opposing parties and some judicial inefficiency.
Any unfairness opposing parties might suffer from this method of
adherence to the client consent rule depends upon their reasonable
reliance on the admissibility of the disclosed communication. If opposing attorneys think the disclosed communication is favorable and
admissible, they may not search as diligently for other evidence. Additionally, they may plan the order and manner of presenting their
evidence on the assumption that the communication is admissible. If
a court then rules the communication inadmissible at trial, opposing
parties would have to restructure their trial presentation, and that
task would be difficult unless the ruling came very early in the trial.
They might also have to initiate a search for other evidence, a search
51. An "out-of-court" disclosure is one that occurs outside the knowledge of the trier of
fact. An in-court disclosure is one in which the content of the confidential communication is
disclosed to the trier of fact. Thus some disclosures that occur in the courtroom or during the
court proceeding should nevertheless be considered out-of-court disclosures.
52. For example, if an attorney has disclosed documents privileged in themselves, the court
could order the return of the documents and any copies. This would limit the damage from
the disclosure, especially where the opposing attorneys possessed the documents for only a
short period of time.
53. Attorneys are not precluded from introducing evidence discovered through leads given
by disclosure of privileged information, see C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LA w OF
EVIDENCE § 89, at 184-85 (Cleary ed. 1972).
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that would probably not bear fruit during the trial unless the court
grants a continuance.
These potential hardships do not weigh against the client consent
rule, however, because opposing attorneys cannot reasonably rely on
the admissibility of privileged communications disclosed by an attorney. 54 Many courts still adhere to the client consent rule, 55 and opposing parties who obtain privileged information should recognize
the risk that the information is inadmissible because the client has
not consented to the disclosure. If all courts adhered to the client
consent rule, opposing attorneys would have no reason to rely on the
admissibility of disclosed attorney-client communications unless
they verified the client's consenno the disclosure. Adherence to the
client consent rule therefore causes little unfairness to opposing parties when the unauthorized attorney disclosure occurs outside the
courtroom. 56
Excluding the specific information yielded in an unauthorized
out-of-court disclosure may slightly reduce judicial efficiency. Proving client consent before introduction of disclosed communications
may require some additional court time. 57 The opposing attorney
may also consume more court time trying to prove the subject matter
of the communication through separate evidence if he is unable to
prove the consent required before introduction of the disclosed communication itself. But since most attorneys present all favorable evidence in any event, little time would be saved by finding waiver.
Additionally, when the client has not consented to the disclosure,
adherence to the client consent rule saves the time required to introduce the disclosed information.
On the other hand, holding that unauthorized attorney disclosures waive the privilege may waste judicial resources by increasing
the number of cases that go to court. The consent rule keeps cases
54. Of course, it may go too far to say that the opposing attorneys could never reasonably
rely on the admissibility of disclosed information. For example, where an attorney constructs
an elaborate fraud to convince the opposing attorneys that the client has consented to the
disclosure when, in fact, the client has not, it might indeed unfairly prejudice the opposing
party not to hold the privilege waived.
55. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
56. This analysis assumes that the opposing attorney has reason to suspect the evidence is
privileged. Conceivably, in rare cases, the opposing attorneys would have no reason to suspect
the evidence is privileged. For example, the contents of the note lost by the bank robber might
contain the client's signature, but might not suggest that it was written to the client's attorney.
The question of unfair prejudice, however, turns on the opposing attorney's reasonable reliance that the evidence is admissible. And where so little is known about evidence that the
opposing attorney does not suspect its privileged nature, reliance on its admissibility is unreasonable.
57. The burden of proving that a co=unication is privileged and that the privilege has
not been waived falls upon the party asserting the privilege. In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82
{2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley &
Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 870 (D. Minn. 1979).
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that could not be maintained without the disclosed information out
of court.58 Furthermore, if disclosures waive the privilege, attorneys
may be less willing to make disclosures that lead to settlements. 59
And if clients withhold information due to an expanded waiver rule,
attorneys may overestimate the strength of their clients' cases, and
therefore settle less readily. For these reasons, neither judicial efficiency nor fairness to opposing parties justifies holding that an attorney's unauthorized out-of-court disclosures waive the attorney-client
privilege.

B. Costs of Protecting the Privilege After .Disclosure in Court
When attorneys disclose privileged communications during a
court proceeding,60 excluding the specific information disclosed is no
longer a viable means of protecting the privilege. The jury has already heard the information, and excluding it as evidence would do
little to repair the damage caused by that breach of the privilege.
Instead, the court can choose between the protective measures of declaring a mistrial and instructing the jury not to consider the disclosed information. This Note argues first that declaring a mistrial is
rarely appropriate, and second that the costs of a corrective instruction may outweigh the costs of finding waiver, depending upon how
the disclosure occurred.
In court, an attorney may breach his client's privilege in two
ways: he himself may introduce privileged communications,61 or he
may fail to object when opposing counsel introduces previously disclosed privileged information.62 In either event, the disclosure will
very rarely6 3 justify a new trial. The opposing party and the court
should rarely bear the expense and delay of a second trial which the
58. Wigmore argued that protecting attorney-client communications by encouraging the
client to fully disclose the facts to the attorney may reduce the amount oflitigation based upon
unfounded claims. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at§ 2291. Some commentators have
criticized this argument on the ground that, should a client discover from one attorney that
certain facts may harm his case, he may go to another attorney and withhold those facts. See,
e.g., Radin, The Privilege ofCo,ifidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF.
L. REV. 487, 490 {1928).
59. Congress considered society's interest in promoting settlements strong enough to warrant excluding from evidence statements made during settlement negotiations. See FED. R.
Evro.408.
60. This discussion assumes that the disclosure was within the presence and knowledge of
the trier of fact. See note 51 supra. While the text assumes that the trier is a jury, the same
analysis should apply where the trier is the judge. However, the need for declaring a mistrial
may be reduced to the extent that judges are better able than juries to ignore inadmissible
evidence that is erroneously introduced.
61. See, e.g., Jones v. Marble Co., 137 N.C. 185, 49 S.E. 94 (1904).
62. See, e.g., United States v. King, 484 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
904 (1974).
63. One of the rare exceptions to this rule might be where an opposing attorney introduces
extremely prejudicial privileged communications that he has stolen from the other attorney's
office.
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attorney could have avoided by properly respecting his client's privilege. Both judicial efficiency and fairness to the opposing party
weigh against declaring a mistrial when privileged information is
disclosed in court.64
The appropriateness of protecting the privilege through a curative instruction depends upon how the breach of the privilege occurred in court. Where an attorney breaches his client's privilege at
trial by himself introducing privileged communications, fairness to
the opposing party probably justifies holding that the disclosure
waives the privilege.65 Here the court could properly be concerned
that the attorney has only disclosed favorable information. In such a
case, a curative instruction would be an insufficient response. Because the disclosure of favorable information still may influence the
jury, attorneys would often introduce favorable privileged information and then assert the privilege before the opposing attorneys could
bring out unfavorable features of the communication. Thus, if a
court did no more than issue a curative instruction to the jury,
prejudice to the opposing party might result. Fairness requires that
the opposite side have an opportunity to rebut the presumably
favorable information disclosed. Because this concern appears to
outweigh the slight chilling effect on attorney-client communication
that may result from :finding waiver in such a narrow class of cases,
the court should hold that this type of in-court disclosure waives the
privilege as to the subject matter of the disclosure.
A curative instruction may be a more appropriate protective
measure when an attorney fails to- make a timely objection to the
introduction of privileged communications by the opposing party.
Here there is little danger that the disclosed information will favor
the client holding the privilege. Although the attorney might wait to
assert the privilege until the opposing attorney begins presenting information unfavorable to the client, the opposing attorney can guard
against any prejudice by introducing the unfavorable part of the
communication first.
Where the disclosure of unfavorable privileged information occurs before the attorney can objeet, the court should not hold the
privilege waived. 66 But where the attorney simply fails to make a
64. This is not true where the trial court erroneously holds the privilege waived. See, e.g.,
Transamerica Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978). That is equivalent
to a compelled disclosure. To permit compelled disclosures would completely destroy the encouragement of attorney-client co=unications that the privilege was designed to achieve.
Clients know that, in each individual case, courts have a strong interest in exposing confidential co=unications.
65. See, e.g., Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 233 (W.D.
Mich. 1966).
66. The court should instruct the jury to disregard the "blurted out" disclosure by the
opposing attorney or the witness. In cases where the disclosed information is highly damaging
to the client and the judge concludes that a corrective instruction will not prevent the informa-
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timely objection, waiver of the privilege might be appropriate. A
failure to make a timely objection usually waives the right to object.67 A number of courts have held that an attorney who fails to
object to the introduction of privileged information may not assert
the privilege on appeal.68 Where the attorney makes a late objection
at the trial, a curative instruction might partially remedy the effects
of the disclosure already made, but it would also decrease the attorney's incentive to make a timely objection. While the correct balance is unclear, a court could justify holding that failure to make a
timely objection waives the privilege by finding that judicial efficiency outweighs any chilling effect caused by waiver. In sum, when
unauthorized attorney disclosures occur during court proceedings,
the costs of protecting the attorney-client privilege, whether by new
trial or by curative instruction, may often outweigh the benefits of
the client consent rule.
CONCLUSION

The attorney-client privilege encourages full communication between attorneys and clients by allaying the client's fear of later adverse use of statements made to the attorney. The privilege exists for
the client's benefit, and most courts have therefore held that an attorney's disclosure without the client's consent does not waive the privilege. Courts that deviate from this "client consent" standard of
attorney waiver, whether on implied authority or agency authority
theories, have failed to realize that this waiver standard, like the underlying privilege, promotes full communication between attorney
and client. A more expansive attorney waiver standard would chill
full communication by some clients who would recognize both the
value of the privilege after disclosure and the inadequacy of remedies for unauthorized attorney disclosures.
The costs of the client consent standard for attorney waiver vary
depending upon the measures used to protect the privilege after disclosure. When the unauthorized attorney disclosure occurs outside
the courtroom, excluding the specific information disclosed from admission at trial seems an appropriate protective measure. On careful
examination, this measure causes little unfaimess to opposing parties
and little reduction of judicial efficiency. When unauthorized attortion from altering the jury's decision, the judge could declare a mistrial. This result would
serve the policy underlying the privilege. Substantial costs in terms of lost court time and
additional effort and expense to the opposing party would accrue, but notions of fairness
strongly favor the holder of the privilege; neither the client nor the attorney representing the
client are responsible for the disclosure before the jury. The case is similar to that in which a
court unwittingly compels disclosure where no waiver has occurred.
67. FED. R. Evm. l03(a)(l) and Advisory Committee Note.
68. United States v. King, 484 F.2d 924 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 904 (1974);
United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1973).

May 1980]

Note -

Attorney-Client Privilege

945

ney disclosures occur in the courtroom, however, feasible protective
measures become considerably more costly. The costs of declaring a
mistrial or delivering a curative instruction may outweigh the benefits of the client consent standard in such circumstances, and holding
the privilege waived may be appropriate.
In any event, absent legislation, courts must decide which standard of attorney waiver to apply. Their decisions should hinge upon
a careful consideration of both the costs and the benefits of protecting the attorney-client privilege after attorney disclosure.

